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Do Junior Academic Bioethicists Have an Obligation to be Activists? 
Abstract:  
Activism and bioethics have enjoyed a somewhat strained relationship. In this paper, I 
consider activism specifically from the perspective of junior academics. I will argue that 
although there may be a prima facie duty for bioethicists to be activists, countervailing 
considerations for junior academics may mean that they, in particular, should refrain from 
undertaking activist activities. I will argue this on the basis of two key claims. First, that 
activism may come at a potential cost to the academics who undertake it, and that these costs 
are potentially of greatest detriment to junior academics undertaking activism. Second, I will 
will argue that junior academics are likely to be less effective activists than established 
academics. Moreover, undertaking activism as a junior academic may prevent one from 
becoming an effective activist later. Finally, I will discuss the implications of this argument 








Do junior academic bioethicists have an obligation to be activists? 
Introduction 
Activism and bioethics have variously been regarded as necessary bedfellows1 or 
incompatible pursuits due to the demands of each.2. In this paper I will argue that although 
there may sometimes be a prima facie duty for bioethicists to be activists, countervailing 
considerations for junior academics may mean that they, in particular, should refrain from 
undertaking activist activities. I will argue this on the basis of two key claims. First, that 
activism may come at a potential cost to the academics who undertake it, and that these costs 
are potentially of greatest detriment to junior academics undertaking activism. Avoidance of 
these costs provides a self-regarding reason for junior academics to not undertake activism. 
Second, I will advance lines of argument similar to those found in the Effective Altruism 
movement, and will argue that junior academics are likely to be less effective activists than 
established academics. Moreover, undertaking activism as a junior academic may prevent one 
from becoming an effective activist later. This provides an other-regarding reason for junior 
academics to not participate in activism. Finally, I will discuss the implications of this 
argument for activist commitments later in one’s career. 
Definitions 
Because the arguments in this paper are not intended to apply universally, it is important to 
be precise about to whom and to what my arguments will apply. My intended focus here is on 
academic bioethicists who are at an early stage in their career.  
                                                          
1 L.S. Parker. 2007. Bioethics as activism. In The Ethics of Bioethics: Mapping the Moral Landscape. L.A. 
Eckenwiler & F. Cohn, ed.: Johns Hopkins University Press: 144-157 
2 D. Benatar. Bioethics and Health and Human Rights: a critical view. J Med Ethics 2006; 32: 17-20. and A. 
Cribb. (2010) Translational ethics? The theory–practice gap in medical ethics. J Med Ethics. 2010; 36: 207-210. 
Terminology varies across institutions, but I am interested in those who may be considered 
‘early career’ or ‘junior’ academics. This does not necessarily mean young academics, as 
many people choose to pursue academic careers later in life, or for various reasons do not 
progress past junior posts. Instead, I am simply referring to those who occupy posts aimed at 
those towards the bottom of the academic career ladder. Junior academic posts tend to take 
the form of teaching or research fellow/assistant/associate positions,3 and these jobs tend to 
have several common traits.  
First, they are often short, fixed-term contracts. This means that junior academics occupying 
these posts are faced with precarity.4 Knowing that one’s contract is due to come to an end 
within months has an impact on one’s ability to formulate and achieve one’s life plans. 
Committing to a mortgage, or planning a family are made more difficult when employed in 
precarious fixed-term contracts. To make matters more challenging, these posts often have 
very tightly-packed workloads. In order to be sufficiently competitive in a difficult funding 
climate, junior academic posts tend to promise a lot of work to funders in relatively little time 
(and it is senior academics who often make these promises to funders). A 12 month research 
fellow post will often include 12 months of project work, which leaves little scope for 
training and development, opportunities to obtain further funding or employment, or even 
annual leave. There is also a worrying trend of junior teaching-based posts only paying 
salaries during term time. Time-pressure is not unique to junior academics, and it may be the 
case that more senior academics experience even greater demands on their time. The 
combination of high workloads coupled with precarity, however, is particularly challenging. 
In order to remove themselves from precarity, junior academics have to develop their CVs, 
                                                          
3 PhD students may also be considered junior academics elsewhere, although for the purposes of this paper, I am 
interested in people who are employed as bioethicists, and this may exclude many PhD students. 
4 University and Colleges Union. 2016. Precarious Work in Higher Education. Available at: 
https://www.ucu.org.uk/media/7995/Precarious-work-in-higher-education-a-snapshot-of-insecure-contracts-and-
institutional-attitudes-Apr-16/pdf/ucu_precariouscontract_hereport_apr16.pdf [Accessed 18 Jan 2019] 
which requires publications and conference presentations, grant income, public engagement 
and the like. It is, however, often extremely difficult to achieve these requirements within 
junior academic posts. 
Having made clearer what I mean by ‘junior academics’, I must now clarify what I mean by 
‘bioethicist’. Benatar outlines two ways in which bioethics as a field can be understood. First, 
and perhaps most commonly, bioethics can be understood as a broad discipline involving 
people from a diverse range of disciplinary backgrounds including sociology, law, 
philosophy, history, medicine and anthropology. Alternatively, bioethics can be understood 
as a branch of applied ethics, concerned with considering ethical issues from a philosophical 
perspective.5 For the purposes of this paper, I will focus my discussion on this second 
understanding of bioethics, so henceforth when I refer to bioethicists, I am referring to 
philosophical bioethicists. This is not intended to suggest that academics from other 
disciplinary backgrounds have a lesser role to play in bioethics as a whole. Instead, as I will 
discuss shortly, it is the philosophical demands of bioethics in the second sense that increase 
the tension between activism and bioethics. I will also narrow my focus onto bioethicists 
undertaking certain types of work. Some philosophical bioethicists may do a great deal of work at 
a deep conceptual level, without paying such attention to the more practical applications. A bioethicist 
could potentially argue that one account of what it means to be autonomous is more theoretically 
robust than another, without necessarily having to give detailed consideration to the application of this 
in, for example, a medical research context. Sheehan and Dunn, however, argue that academic 
bioethics projects must be focussed primarily on addressing a practical ought question in 
order to be bioethics.6 Brassington has made related claims, suggesting that philosophical ethics 
(and presumably by extension philosophical bioethics), has as arguably its primary function “not just 
to understand moral claims and conflicts… but to act as a source of normativity: to offer 
                                                          
5 Benatar, op. cit. note 2. pp.17-20 
6 M. Sheehan & M. Dunn. On the Nature and Sociology of Bioethics. Health Care Anal 2013; 21: 54-69. 
guidance or instruction about what to do.”7 Sheehan and Dunn, maybe more controversially, 
argue that “a piece of research or public activity is not correctly defined as bioethics unless it 
aims at actually convincing people to act differently or to change policy because of the 
arguments and answers that the bioethicist provides”.8 Although I need not necessarily 
wholly endorse their account of what constitutes bioethics, I will focus my arguments on 
bioethicists undertaking the sort of work described by Sheehan and Dunn (and indeed 
Brassington), where practical recommendations are made which offer guidance or instruction 
about what to do. 
Finally it is also important to be clear about what I refer to as activism. Existing literature 
describes something of a scale of activist activity, although it is apparent that various terms 
are used inconsistently. It is therefore not always obvious where the boundaries lie between 
conventional ‘academic’ applied philosophy, advocacy and activism. Dempsey and Lister, for 
example, define ‘extreme activism’ as “a form of applied philosophy directly addressed to 
policy-makers, with the goal of bringing about a particular outcome, and measures success in 
terms of whether it makes a direct causal contribution to that goal”.9 Although they call this 
extreme, the method of applied philosophy suggested sounds much less extreme than, for 
example, environmental activists living in tree-top encampments to prevent road 
developments. What Dempsey and Lister describe as extreme activism falls towards the 
passive side of the activism spectrum and is not particularly controversial. It seems almost 
unavoidable for bioethicists to sometimes take a stance and argue for particular positions, and 
simply addressing these arguments at policy makers does not seem to constitute activism as it 
would normally be understood. 
                                                          
7 I. Brassington. What’s the point of philosophical bioethics?. Health Care Anal 2013; 21: p23 
8 Sheehan & Dunn op. cit. note 6 p58 
9 M.M. Dempsey & M. Lister. 2016. Applied Political and Legal Philosophy. In A Companion to Applied 
Philosophy. K. Lippert-Rasmussen, Brownlee, K, & Coady, D. eds.  New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc:. 313-
327 
Dempsey and Lister’s account of activism seems correct in terms of being goal-orientated, 
but fails to capture the essential methods of activism. Parker explains this clearly when she 
states that although bioethics may share with much activism the goal of promoting social 
justice, the usual bioethics approach of transparent ethical reasoning is ‘business as usual’ for 
bioethics. Rather, for Parker, activism seeks to disrupt business as usual, and “to cause a 
rupture that draws attention to systemic flaws, particularly injustice”.10 Although the level of 
disruption required for something to be considered activism is debateable, activism as I will 
understand it does require the taking of action and campaigning, and making a concerted 
effort to make people pay attention beyond that which is required to meet one’s strictly 
academic goals. 
To give a concrete example, when publishing an academic paper regarding the ethical 
desirability of opt-out organ donation one may argue in favour of such a system in the hope 
that some people (probably academics) will read it and pay attention, but this is largely 
passive. Disseminating the same paper to colleagues for academic critique does not seem 
much like activism. Tweeting or emailing the paper directly to a policymaker might start to 
appear to be more like activism. And actively making that policymaker pay attention to one’s 
arguments, by persistently trying to organise meetings, campaigning and generating public 
support would look a lot like activism. In short, merely publishing one’s carefully constructed 
arguments in academic journals is not enough – activism involves taking things a step further, 
and getting people to pay attention and take these arguments seriously with the goal of 
affecting change. 
Effective Activism 
                                                          
10 Parker op. cit. note 1, p146 
The Effective Altruism11 movement has developed over recent years and is premised on 
simple starting points. Although how such things should be measured is highly contestable, 
some charities achieve more good than others. It is also true that some charities achieve more 
good for less money, and are therefore more cost effective than others. Effective altruists 
generally believe that, given the choice between achieving more good or less good through 
one’s charitable activities, one should choose the charities that do more good. Taken to its 
logical conclusion, this means that one should choose charities that achieve the most good. 
This can entail choosing charities that one may not ordinarily consider: the most effective 
charities seem to be ones without big marketing budgets and are therefore charities that many 
people will never have heard of. An example of how this can play out is that of charities 
aimed at supporting blind people. Training a guide dog costs a lot of money (around 
£45,000),12 and will help one person who is already blind. Using the same money to treat 
certain conditions in the developing world will cure blindness in several people, which is 
arguably a much greater good.13 Despite this, guide dog charities receive a lot of charitable 
donations in the UK, whereas charities preventing blindness receive comparatively little. For 
effective altruists, charity is not so much about choosing charities which resonate emotionally 
with oneself, as choosing the most cost-effective charities. Effective Altruism is therefore 
sometimes described as being cold and calculating, but this is unfair: there is nothing cold 
about wanting to achieve more good. Although Effective Altruism is a movement broadly 
underpinned by utilitarianism, one need not be a committed consequentialist to accept that 
some charities pursue more worthwhile causes than others, or that some charities achieve 
                                                          
11 Efective Altruism. 2019. Effective Altruism Homepage. Available at https://www.effectivealtruism.org/ 
[Accessed 18 Jan 2019] 
12 Guide Dogs. 2019. Sponsor a Puppy FAQ. Available at: https://www.guidedogs.org.uk/faqs/sponsor-a-puppy/ 
[Accessed 18 Jan 2019] 
13 Giving What We Can. 2019.  What we can achieve. Available at: https://www.givingwhatwecan.org/get-
involved/what-we-can-achieve/  [Accessed 18 Jan 2019]  
more per donation than others (and that this counts in their favour when choosing to which 
charity to donate).14  
An interesting aspect of the ‘warm and calculating’ nature of Effective Altruism is that one 
ought to take a relatively long-term approach to one’s altruism.15 Rather than simply donating 
money to charity constantly throughout one’s life, one might increase one’s ability to give 
money to charity if one actually spends money on oneself. For instance, training to become a 
medical doctor requires a significant financial commitment. But training as a doctor will 
increase one’s earning potential, thereby increasing one’s ability to contribute to charity 
going forward. A commitment to give 10% of a doctor’s lifetime salary to charity will yield a 
greater donation than a commitment to give 10% of an average office-worker’s salary to 
charity, even if the average office-worker donated for the 5 years that the doctor was training. 
Similarly, saving money to buy a house may detract money from the potentially donatable 
pot over the short term, but the long-term benefits of home-ownership versus renting may 
make this worthwhile. In short, actions that may appear to be self-regarding can also have 
robust other-regarding justifications, provided that one is inclined towards such other-
regarding motivation. 
This idea of effectiveness may also be a useful concept when considering activism. It seems 
reasonable to think that activism has the capability to achieve good, but also that there is 
some cost to activism. This cost may most obviously be in terms of time and effort, but as I 
will argue shortly, there are other potential costs involved. Given that an individual’s activist 
resources (broadly construed) are not limitless, it also seems sensible that one should seek to 
                                                          
14 Although a detailed discussion of Effective Altruism is not possible here, it should be noted that its utilitarian 
underpinnings may make it vulnerable to familiar criticisms regarding demandingness and impartiality. There is 
also debate regarding the impact of proximity on moral obligation. See, for example: S. Reader. Distance, 
relationship and moral obligation. The Monist, 2003; 86(3): 367-381.  
15 B. Todd. 2017. Which job help people the most?. Available at: https://80000hours.org/career-guide/high-
impact-jobs/ [Accessed 18 Jan 2019] 
ensure a good outcome from one’s efforts. This does not necessarily mean that one’s activism 
has to fully achieve one’s goals in order to be effective (just as one’s charitable donations 
need not, for example, completely eradicate poverty-related disease in order to be effective). 
Activism is effective when it is causally responsible for bringing about change in the 
direction of the goal.  Not all activism is, or is likely to be, effective, and various factors may 
influence this. Just as with altruism, it seems preferable for one’s activism to bring about 
more good rather than less. And just as with altruism, a level of prudence and ‘playing the 
long game’ may lead to more good being achieved by one’s efforts16. 
An argument in favour of bioethicists as activists 
The fact that activism within academic bioethics is contentious in a way that activism in other 
aspects of academia is not (there is rarely suggestion that Professors of Literature have an 
obligation to be activists, or conversely an obligation to not be activists) suggests that there is 
something special about the role of academic bioethicists.  
It has been occasionally argued that bioethicists have a duty to be activists, or alternatively 
that they have a duty to refrain from activism. These arguments are often grounded in the 
idea that the roots of bioethics are in activism, and that as a field it arose from the need to 
address various injustices.17 The arguments in favour of bioethicists being activists seem to 
suggest that in doing bioethics, one ought to be concerned with social justice and bringing 
about positive change. This does, of course, leave open the extent to which one should invest 
one’s energies in this, and perhaps one might do enough to satisfy these demands by usual 
                                                          
16 Although I will not consider it within this paper, the idea of effective activism may also suggest that some 
activist causes are more worthwhile than others. It may be that bioethicists should pursue activist ends likely to 
produce the most good, although this may vary according to their abilities to bring about this good. 
17 Parker, op. cit. note 1 pp144-157 
academic methods, without resorting to activism oneself but instead intentionally supplying 
activists with argumentative ammunition. 
As outlined earlier, I am interested in the more conventional understanding of activism of 
taking action to change the world for the better, and making additional effort to ensure the 
positions that one argues for are adopted. Some bioethicists do, I believe, have a duty to 
engage in activism, on the basis of the following simple argument: 
Bioethicists spend time thinking about what would be a better or worse state of affairs. For 
certain states of affairs, when confident that one state of affairs is better than another, and 
they are in a position to assist bringing about change to result in a better state of affairs 
without unreasonably high cost to themselves, bioethicists should attempt to bring about the 
change. 
 
Whether this argument is convincing, of course, depends upon the truth of its premises.  
I take it to be uncontroversial that bioethicists spend time thinking about what would be a 
better or worse state of affairs. Bioethicists, at least as I have defined them earlier, are 
concerned with ideas of right and wrong. Although different bioethicists may underpin their 
reasoning with different moral theory, it is surely the case that all bioethicists argue, at some 
point that, for some reason or another, one state of affairs is (all things considered) better or 
worse than others. Even if they do not publish their positions, they must at least spend time 
thinking about this. 
I also take it as relatively uncontroversial, that, for many aspects of their work, bioethicists 
are likely to be confident that they are correct in their position that one state of affairs is 
better than other. Disagreement on moral issues is perhaps inevitable, and many bioethicists 
will presumably acknowledge that other people will have different values and beliefs, but if a 
bioethicist argues for a particular position, one assumes that they are often doing so because 
they are confident that that position is both defensible and better than others.18 It may be 
unwise to become so confident in one’s views that one is ignorant to criticism, and one 
should always be open to the idea of revising one’s views on the basis of compelling 
counterargument, but it is also reasonable to expect a bioethicist to have the ability to expose 
their own views to appropriate critique. Bioethicists should be able to perform ‘due diligence’ 
on their own positions.  
An obvious point of contention is the claim that bioethicists should attempt to bring about 
some better states of affairs that they have identified. As stated earlier, the type of bioethics 
under discussion seeks to address practical ought questions. One might argue, however, that 
the duty of bioethicists is discharged by providing arguments to support or criticise particular 
states of affairs, and that no further action is required. Dreger and Bayliss suggest that some 
bioethicists believe that “engaging in translational or direct interventional work is the role 
and responsibility of others, such as lawyers, investigative reporters, professionalized 
activists, and administrators charged with ethics oversight”.19 It certainly seems reasonable to 
think that this sort of work could fall under the remit of these types of people. It also seems 
reasonable to think that these types of people should keep themselves informed and stay 
abreast of academic debate, so that they can perform their roles adequately. But what if they 
fail to do these things? If, despite the efforts of bioethicists to publish and disseminate their 
work, no appropriate changes arise, can the bioethicist relax and consider their task to be 
complete? Dreger and Baylis seem reluctant to support this, and suggest that along with the 
aim of being a competent knowledge producer, “bioethicists have an attendant duty to act 
                                                          
18 This is not to say that this is always the case. A bioethicist could conceivably publish a rebuttal of another 
bioethicist’s argument even though they agree that the position argued for would be a better state of affairs. 
Others may argue for positions that they do not genuinely believe, simply to be controversial.  
19 A Dreger & F Baylis 2018. More than Words. In Bioethics in Action. F. Baylis & A. Dreger, eds. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press: p4 
(when possible) on this knowledge, in a committed and sustained fashion”. This is echoed by 
Danis et al, who argue that one of the core commitments of bioethics is a concern for justice, 
and that this commitment “is manifest in an obligation to promote health equity – to ensure 
that all people have full and equal access to opportunities that enable them to lead healthy 
lives”.20 Dawson et al have similarly suggested that bioethicists have “an individual 
responsibility to act, and… responsibilities as part of a community, to act together on behalf 
of others in urgent need, especially where they cannot act in their own interests and/or are 
silenced by authorities”21  
My argument above is qualified by ‘certain states of affairs’, which leaves open precisely 
which states of affairs a bioethicist may have an obligation to take additional action to try to 
bring about. It would perhaps be unrealistic to suggest that bioethicists have a duty to try to 
bring about every state of affairs for which they argue. The argument seems most compelling 
when failing to take additional action leaves people at risk of severe harm or injustice, 
particularly if, as is often the case, these people are vulnerable and unable to adequately 
represent their own interests. The argument could apply in other situations too, however. 
Dreger and Bayliss criticise what they term ‘intellectual punditry’, where bioethicists make 
careers out of analysis and commentary, without any sustained attempts to prevent the 
injustices, abuses of patients and the like from which they themselves are ultimately 
benefitting career-wise.22 For the purposes of the arguments in this paper, I need not fully 
specify the range of states of affairs that bioethicists have an obligation to try to bring about. 
The important claim is that there are some situations where bioethicists do have a duty to take 
                                                          
20 M. Danis. Y. Wilson & A. White. Bioethicists can and should contribute to addressing racism. AmJ Bioeth 
2016; 16: p5 
21 A. Dawson, C.F. Jordens, P. Macneill, D. Zion. Bioethics and the Myth of Neutrality. J Bioeth Inq 
2018;15:p485 
22 Dreger and Bayliss op. cit. p4 
action beyond normal academic channels in order to bring about a better state of affairs (or to 
prevent a worse state of affairs).  
Although these starting points are themselves open to disagreement, I will use them as the 
starting points throughout of this paper. I will spend the rest of this paper considering what I 
believe to be the other contentious parts of this argument.  
 
Whether bioethicists are well-positioned to bring about change is complex and will be true 
for some bioethicists more than others. Similarly, the costs of attempting to bring about 
change will be greater for some than for others. Academia can be a challenging environment 
for people at all career stages, but I will argue that there are particular reasons for early career 
academics to delay participation in activism until later in their careers. I will base this 
argument on two central claims: 
i) Senior academics are likely to be more effective activists than junior academics. 
ii) Participating in activism can come at a higher cost to junior academics than senior 
academics; 
 
Senior Academics are Likely to be More Effective Activists 
A central part of my argument for bioethicists being activists is that they are well-positioned 
to bring about change resulting in a better state of affairs. This can be taken to hinge on two 
component parts. First, that bioethicists are well-equipped to determine what constitutes a 
better state of affairs, and that they also have some ability to help bring about this state of 
affairs. 
Ability 
Although I cannot fully address the idea of moral expertise in this paper, I will assume that 
bioethicists do not have moral expertise as conventionally understood. Archard defines moral 
expertise as “a claim to command knowledge in respect of the making of normative 
judgments not commanded by others”.23 The claim that bioethicists do not have moral 
expertise is therefore that they do not have access to special moral knowledge that an 
‘ordinary’ person does not. A proclamation that a certain course of action is morally 
preferable to another should carry no additional weight simply because it is made by a 
bioethicist. The merit of the statement depends instead on the quality and robustness of the 
supporting argument. One might expect bioethicists to perhaps come up with more 
theoretically robust or clearer justifications for their positions than others, but there is no 
reason that a non-bioethicist could not also do this in many instances. One should expect 
bioethicists to have this ability, but this ability does not place bioethicists in a unique 
position.  
An ability to devise theoretically robust arguments also does not necessarily make for 
effective activism. Effective activism requires more than just good, robust argumentation – (it 
may even be the case that activism does not need robust argumentation at all to achieve its 
ends, if some other form of persuasion is more effective): it also requires other people being 
willing to listen and take one’s arguments seriously. There are several things that will 
encourage others to take one’s arguments seriously, but one such factor can be broadly 
construed as ‘credibility’.  
Credibility 
Scepticism about moral expertise is closely related to the issue of credibility. Because almost 
everyone can do ethics to some extent, and because everyone normally has intuitions about 
                                                          
23 D. Archard Why moral philosophers are not and should not be moral experts. Bioethics. 2011;25: p121. 
what is right or wrong, as a bioethicist it can be difficult to elevate one’s own carefully 
considered ethical view above the sometimes less robustly justified views of others that may 
dominate arenas of debate. One need only look at how ethical arguments are treated by some 
medical journals or by some medical professionals. Medical journals often relegate ethics-
based articles to the status of ‘letters to the editor’, ‘comment’ or ‘personal viewpoint’. And a 
cursory read through these sections demonstrates that the arguments that dominate these 
sections often fall short of what would ordinarily be considered a robust ethics paper. 
Because of the lack of clear moral expertise, there is a risk that one’s carefully constructed 
arguments are dismissed as mere opinions. This can be particularly difficult given the 
divisive nature of claims that bioethicists often make. It is not unusual for bioethicists to be 
critical of the medical profession, or at least the medical profession’s way of doing particular 
things, and it is easy to dismiss well-justified criticism if one can refer to it as opinion.  
So what can give one credibility in bioethical issues? One way of looking at this is by 
drawing a distinction between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’24. Take the example of a philosopher 
who has spent her entire career in her metaphorical ivory tower focussing on complex moral 
theory, but now suddenly takes an interest in a bioethical issue such as conscientious 
objection. She has no experience of the practicalities of this issue, approaches the issue very 
much as a philosopher, yet is activating for change. It would be no surprise for those with a 
much greater experience of this issue to dismissively ask ‘who is this person?’ and regard 
them as an outsider whose views on this issue do not need to be taken seriously. Of course, 
whether it is right to think like this is extremely questionable, but people do not always think 
like they ought to.    
                                                          
24 I am aware that there is a more technical literature on these ideas, but I use them in a lay sense here. 
One may transition from being an outsider to an insider in various ways. One plausible way is 
by becoming a stakeholder in the ethical issue, either by directly experiencing it or by 
belonging to the more general group of people who tend to experience such issues. Having a 
direct insight into, for example, children with disabilities can make one an effective 
campaigner for change in this area. The lived experience that one gathers through being 
involved means that the perspective of these people is not only important, but also 
increasingly recognised by many as being important. Increased emphasis on patient and 
public involvement in research, and the empirical turn witnessed in some areas of bioethics 
highlights that experiences and perspectives are considered to have a role to play in practical 
issues within an academic context. There is admittedly a tension here, as experiencing 
challenging situations also has the potential to cloud one’s judgment, remove the perception 
of impartiality, and make one feel personally attacked if anyone disagrees with one’s 
accounts of one’s experiences. But outside of academia it is also the case that being seen to 
have experienced something oneself provides an immediate response to the all-too-common 
criticism thrown at people with whom one disagrees (including on ethical issues): that they 
do not really know or understand what they are talking about. 
Another way to become an insider is to be a medical doctor. It is not particularly rare for 
medical doctors to also have additional qualifications in ethics, but it is even less rare for 
medical doctors to list ethics amongst their interests. This is no bad thing in itself, as having 
the double benefit of medical expertise and philosophical training makes for some formidable 
bioethicists. But there are many medical doctors who, despite having limited or no formal 
training in philosophical analysis, are positioned as ethics experts. It is not uncommon to find 
ethics debates on the timetables of medical conferences, and to also discover that the panel 
consists solely of medical doctors with no training in ethics. As with the key stakeholder 
group just discussed, medical doctors have the lived experience of the ethical issues, coupled 
with medical expertise, which makes others take them seriously.    
Another way to become an ‘insider’ is to be an established, senior academic. First, simply 
having ‘professor’ in front of one’s name is an indicator of the esteem in which people should 
hold one. The title indicates that a person has a strong reputation, an established track-record 
and is taken seriously within academia. Additionally, as someone who will normally have 
been a bioethicist in the field for a long time, they will be a familiar face, and likely be 
known and respected amongst the people that they may seek to influence. By attending 
conferences, publishing in journals that clinicians read, serving on hospital ethics committees 
and generally becoming ‘part of the furniture’, senior academics can establish credibility. 
Credibility in this sense is something that is built up over time, as one gradually earns the 
respect of others. So while bioethicists can become insiders, it is not simply by virtue of 
being a bioethicist – it is instead a process that one must go through.  
The problem with junior bioethicists is that they are, by definition, generally new to the field. 
They are likely to be largely unknown and will not yet have developed the credibility that 
more senior academics have. Although one would expect a junior bioethicist to have the 
ability to develop robust arguments, it is unlikely that they will have the credibility required 
to get people (and particularly the people who matter) to listen to and take their arguments 
seriously. This is evidenced to an extent by the types of people who are invited to take part in 
policy groups or (independent) advisory bodies. The Nuffield Council on Bioethics, for 
example, aims to inform and engage policy and media debate, and make policy 
recommendations, and it is no surprise to see that it consists almost exclusively of senior 
academics.25 This is not a criticism of the Nuffield Council, as they obviously want the best 
                                                          
25 Nuffield Council on Bioethics. 2018 Council Members. Availaable at: 
http://nuffieldbioethics.org/about/council-members [Accessed 18 Jan 2019]  
bioethicists as their members, but it may indicate an assumption that most experienced 
implies best and most credible. 
 
Costs of Activism for Junior Academics 
Academic Credibility 
Philosophy inhabits an idealised area of academic thought, where impartiality, rationality 
and, to some extent, neutrality are expected. Academic philosophers sometimes speak of the 
‘academic perspective’ as though it is possible to detach oneself from one’s prior 
commitments and form oneself into an empty vessel through which rational thought can flow 
unhindered by one’s existing biases, preferences and false beliefs. Activism presents a 
potential issue here, since it tends to reflect a greater personal investment and commitment to 
particular perspectives in a way that runs contrary to this idealised academic perspective. The 
tension between academic bioethics and activism is described succinctly by Benatar when 
discussing human rights, who states that “an activist agenda is more likely to presuppose 
which rights should be ascribed (or which rights should prevail) than it is to engage, as 
dispassionately as possible, the question about whether these rights ascriptions are warranted. 
Scholarship becomes but a handmaiden to the predetermined activist agenda.”26 
It is these matters of ‘presupposing’ and ‘predetermining’ that are potentially problematic if 
one engages in activism at an early stage in one’s career. Bioethicists occupy a difficult space 
in academia, where on the one hand our arguments are supposed to be something more than 
just our personal opinions on matters, but at the same time are inevitably shaped significantly 
by our own values and beliefs. It is potentially problematic to think that bioethicists can 
completely detach themselves from their prior commitments and truly take an impartial view 
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on moral issues. It also seems unrealistic to require bioethicists to enter their career without 
an agenda of some sort: it does not appear objectionable for a bioethicist to have an 
overarching agenda to improve things. 
Bioethical arguments typically rely on at least some presupposed starting points, which will 
not be universally agreed upon. These may be fundamental ethical (“I assume that we should 
promote utility”) or even metaethical positions, or they may be further down the line of 
reasoning and closer to the applied issue (“I assume that abortion is morally permissible”). 
There is a concern that sometimes bioethicists start with their conclusions and develop 
arguments to support these. And the closer that one’s theoretical starting point is to the 
applied issue, the more vulnerable bioethicists are to the claim ‘well they would say that, 
wouldn’t they?’. Activism arguably commits one to starting points that are too close to the 
applied issue. Once one has engaged with activism on an applied issue and made the 
investment that such activity requires, it may be very difficult to ever go back and reconsider 
one’s starting points, or be open to changing one’s mind. A bioethics project that claims to 
know its conclusions before arguments have been fully explored does not seem ideal, but this 
is a risk when activism becomes involved. Being perceived as having an agenda that commits 
one to a single-minded way of thinking about issues may hinder the gaining of credibility that 
is crucial to effective activism.27  
                                                          
27 This may not be true in all scenarios: it is possible that a bioethicist’s beliefs may be based on a fully explored 
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may even seem wrong to think that there is any need to entertain the possibility to go back and reconsider one’s 




It is not always easy to delineate ‘work’ and ‘not work’ for bioethicists. There may be a 
notional working week for many, but one can easily find oneself stretching this in order to 
achieve what one needs, or wants, to achieve. Moreover, one can just as easily find oneself 
reading books about philosophy, lying awake at night puzzling over philosophical questions 
or refining arguments in one’s head, just as one might do during one’s working week. Some 
bioethicists may consider themselves fortunate to work in areas that allow them to think, 
write and talk about things about which they are passionate. The cliché that if you find a job 
that you enjoy you will never do a day’s work again in your life should not, however, also 
mean that you can never have time off.  
The first claim that I make here is not that academics already work too long, or that 
academics should rigidly stick to their notional working week (although these claims may 
receive some support), but rather that one’s working time obligations must have a limit. One 
may voluntarily work additional hours, or spend one’s own time refining one’s arguments, 
but this cannot be an obligation. In short, work cannot reasonably take up all of one’s day or 
one’s week.  
The second claim that I wish to make is that if there is a duty to undertake activism, and this 
arises from the work that one undertakes as a bioethicist, then that activism should  be 
considered an extension of one’s work. Undertaking the additional actions required to see 
one’s arguments bring about change should be regarded as seeing the task of bioethics on that 
issue through to its endpoint, and should reasonably be considered to constitute work.28 And 
if activism constitutes work, it should be done within that finite quantity of work time.  
Given these claims, and that activism itself takes time, activism comes at an opportunity cost 
to other things that one might do within one’s work time. Most bioethicists face time 
pressures. Time pressures are not unique to junior academics, and it may even be the case that 
with good line-management and mentoring, junior academics are protected from many of the 
excessive demands that more senior colleagues are faced with. Junior bioethicists may spend 
their work time doing various activities, some of which will be required and some of which 
will be optional, but it is reasonable for them to prioritise those that will help them to achieve 
a permanent post and establish themselves within academia. It is, of course, debateable 
whether current metrics of academic ability/performance are the right ones, but in terms of 
establishing oneself as a credible candidate for permanent employment, things such as 
publications, grant income and teaching experience are particularly important. Although there 
may be some exceptions (see section on Impact later), it is generally the case that activist 
activities will not produce the kinds of measurable results that are useful for obtaining oneself 
a job. 
Additionally, when I was undertaking my PhD, I was given one piece of advice regarding 
obtaining permanent employment that has stuck with me: ‘make yourself indispensable’. This 
meant being a ‘team player’ and contributing to the demands of the department in which I 
worked. This involved contributing to teaching, marking and generally being seen to say 
‘yes’ to requests from colleagues. At the start of one’s academic career, it is important to 
build networks of colleagues and collaborators with whom one can work in future, and being 
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perceived as someone who contributes to departmental efforts seems an important part of 
this. Because activism blurs the boundaries between the personal and the professional, there 
is a risk that a junior academic prioritising activist activities over contributions to 
departmental efforts would be perceived as pursuing a personal agenda over departmental 
needs.  
The self-regarding reason to prioritise those activities that increase one’s prospect of 
permanent academic employment may not convince everybody. There are, however, other-
regarding reasons to prioritise these activities. If one’s ability to be an effective activist arises 
at least in part from one’s role as a bioethicist, then it seems sensible to take action to 
maximise the time that one spends as a bioethicist. Although one may compromise one’s 
activist activities in the short term, by prioritising activities likely to result in longer-term 
employment, one is able to engage with activism for longer (and more effectively) throughout 
one’s longer career.  
The right order 
The potential costs of activism outlined above may be significant in the short term to both 
junior and senior bioethicists, but they are likely to have a significant ongoing detrimental 
impact upon the careers of junior bioethicists to an extent that is much less likely for senior 
bioethicists. For example, it seems unlikely that a senior academic is going to lose credibility 
for more actively pursuing change towards something that is consistent with the arguments 
they have made throughout their career. And it seems unlikely that pursuing this would result 
in them losing their academic career. On the other hand, spending one’s career arguing for 
something that one started off as an activist for may hinder one’s gaining of credibility, and 
prevent one from establishing a secure academic career. The tension between academia and 
effective activism can be stated as follows: effective activism relies on the credibility 
obtained by being an established academic and doing the things that academics do, but being 
an activist can prevent one from becoming an established academic and developing 
credibility. It therefore seems sensible that the effectiveness of activism can be maximised if 
one goes about things in the right order. 
If my arguments thus far are convincing, then attempting to undertake activism as a 
bioethicist prior to having established that credibility may have a long-lasting impact on both 
one’s own academic career, but also on one’s potential effectiveness as an activist. For these 
reasons, it would seem reasonable for junior bioethicists to delay activism until they have 
reached a point in their career where they have established sufficient credibility to be 
effective activists. 
 
Is Activism Always Optional for Junior Academics? 
I have thus far argued that the early stages of one’s academic career may not make a good 
time for activism. I will now explore some further ramifications and exceptions to this 
argument. 
Acknowledging Privilege 
An important consideration and one not discussed explicitly thus far is the idea of privilege 
within academia. Within my argument there are tacit assumptions about normal career 
progressions, diminishing precarity and an assumption that academia will generally reward 
people roughly equally for their contributions and achievements. It is known, however, that 
these assumptions will not hold true for everybody.29 There are people for whom existing 
within academia already requires concerted  levels of activism. The academic world may not, 
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for example, always be particularly welcoming to people with autism, and various changes 
may be required in order to help autistic academics to flourish. The existence and continued 
efforts (beyond those that other academics may have to make for themselves) of autistic 
academics helps to create and normalise suitable environments and practices for other autistic 
academics, and their presence may also serve to encourage other autistic people to pursue 
academic careers in future.  Other unjustified inequalities and challenges resulting from 
gender, race, health and disability are plainly unacceptable and need to be resolved.   
The arguments that I have put forward may place an unfair burden on those who have to be 
activists in order to be bioethicists. Moreover, by excusing junior bioethicists from engaging 
in activism, my arguments may further disadvantage those who are already having to engage 
in activism to be junior bioethicists, by giving some people a clear conscience to go away and 
build their CVs and establish their career without considering other less privileged junior 
bioethicists.  
It may be helpful here to distinguish between activism inside academia and activism outside 
academia. It seems entirely reasonable to think that academics have an obligation to promote 
an inclusive and diverse academy, and to take action to counter the privilege that one may 
encounter from day to day, and that this is an important role as an academic. Whether this has 
to amount to activism as understood in this paper is open to debate, but we should all be 
doing something. For example, male academics should resist appearing in panels consisting 
only of men. For junior male academics, this may come at the cost of turning down 
something potentially creditable on their CV, which is certainly a cost, but this must be 
considered in light of the fact that junior female academics may have been unfairly 
overlooked. This sort of action does not seem at odds with the role of bioethicists within 
academia. Parker suggests that bioethicists “take substantive moral positions and also seek to 
create tolerant venues in a pluralistic society in which others may do the same”30, and our 
obligation to promote a diverse academy should be regarded as an extension of this, rather 
than broader activism. 
Impact 
The UK-based Impact Agenda31 adds an additional dimension to activism, in that in some 
instances, achieving the ends of one’s activism may also demonstrate Impact. My arguments 
for delaying activism have generally assumed that undertaking activism will hinder one’s 
career, whereas being able to demonstrate meaningful Impact is distinctly advantageous. This 
does not undermine the general argument, but instead provides a potential exception. If one 
can use activism to generate Impact, then this would seem like a good use of a junior 
bioethicist’s efforts. Of course, it is not necessarily the case that activism will be the most 
effective or appropriate way of generating Impact, or that the goals of one’s activism and 
Impact aims will neatly align. Due to the necessity for Impact to be evidenced and 
demonstrably a result of research, Impact aims are often concrete and readily achievable, 
whereas some aims of activism may be slightly ‘bigger picture’. Nonetheless, Impact is 
another important consideration for junior bioethicists to consider when thinking about what 
it is reasonable to prioritise.  
The Commitment – The activism must be done at some point 
The upshot of what I have argued for is that if one is a junior academic and, for prudent 
reasons, decides to postpone activism until later in one’s career when one can more 
effectively be an activist, it is precisely that: a postponement. If the earlier arguments are 
                                                          
30 Parker, op. cit. note 1. P153 
31 Higher Education Funding Council for England. 2016. REF Impact. Available at: 
http://www.hefce.ac.uk/rsrch/REFimpact/  [Accessed 18 Jan 2019]  
 
convincing, and one accepts that activism is best placed later in a bioethicist’s career, then 
influential bioethicists in secure posts (with the ability to affect change) may have an  
obligation be activists. It may be that there is never a perfect time to undertake activism, as 
senior academics face many pressures, and committing time to activism may only add to 
these.32 Returning to my earlier argument in favour of an obligation for bioethicists being 
activists, there was a condition that the obligation arises only if there is not unreasonable cost 
to oneself. For junior academics, an unreasonable cost would be the premature end of one’s 
academic career. Although not universally true given the current academic climate, 
established academics do not generally face the same precarity that junior academics face. 
Whereas failing to bolster one’s CV with additional publications may be catastrophic for a 
junior academic, the impact may be less significant for a senior academic. Once someone has 
worked their way towards the top of the career ladder, and enjoyed a long academic career, 
the costs of activism seem relatively smaller, and this removes many of the reasons to not 
engage with activism.  
Conclusion 
I have argued that, in some circumstances, there is a prima facie duty for bioethicists to be 
activists, but that it is not the case that all academics are well-positioned to be activists. In 
particular, I have argued that junior bioethicists are unlikely to have sufficient credibility to 
be effective activists. This, coupled with the costs to junior academics of being activists, 
would provide reasons for junior bioethicists to delay activism until later in their career. 
Significantly, this does not excuse them from being activists. It is instead intended to 
maximise the good that they achieve from their activism, by ensuring first that they have a 
secure academic career to act as a springboard for effective activism. 
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